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THE DIRECTORS'
DILEMMA
In Kafka's novel, "The Trial," a bank clerk named
Joseph K. is accosted in his room by menacing strangers in
unrecognizable uniforms, who summon him to a strange
sort of assembl , where someone sitting in the high seat
hurls incomprehensible words at him in an accusatory tone,
and every attempt of Joseph K. to ask what the proceeding is
about is drowned out by the angr murmurs of a crowded
audience.
This story has generally been understood as a parable of
the little man in the overbearing presence of the wielders of
power. But a deep sense of kinship with Joseph K. may have
been felt b many corporate directors when Ralph Nader
announced last spring that on May 1, American Big Business
would be put on trial. Like Joseph K., they must have
wondered who were these process servers, who sealed
their writs, and by what authority they called Big Business
to trial. If they listened on May 1, they were probably
equally puzzled about what they were accused of doing,
and what edicts of what puissance they had transgressed.
For those directors who wonder whether people think
they are really guilty, there may be comfort in a book of
essays assembled by Henry Manne, entitled "The Attack on
Corporate America." I hardly need tell you that Manne's
team was speaking in defense, not in attack. He posed the
question "Should Corporations Assume More Social
Responsibilities, " and the answer is , "No, they will do more
good by trying to make money ." The next question is "Does
the Corporation Discourage Individual Responsibility, " and
the answer of course is, "No, it maximizes it." And so on
through 62 questions, each of which implies some corporate
failing, and 62 answers , each in an emphatic negative .

The Dilemma
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The raging of this word battle is not in itself a subject of
great concern to corporate directors. Such battles may be
expected to rage in a land of free expression. But directors
do have to ask themselves whether the battle of words
reflects some more fundamental problems, of which these
words are tell-tale symptoms. When we look, we cannot
miss some signs of trouble which are not features of the
recent (or current) recession (or depression)-whatever
you think it is, or was-but secular aspects of recent
decades.
One of these symptoms is the financial crisis faced by
some of our largest and historically successful corporations .
A giant transportation company that had paid dividends for
a hundred years went into bankruptcy. One of the world's
largest automobile companies had to turn to the U .S.
governme nt for financing . One of the world's largest steel
companies had to be protected from the competition of a
country that has to import its coal. its oil, and its iron ore,
and can still deliver steel at U.S. ports more cheaply than
U.S. manufacturers .
A second symptom is the decline in productivity and of
investment in new equipment, which go hand in hand .
Recent reports of the 20-nation Organization for Economic

Cooperation and D velopment show a U.S. annual
productivity loss for 1978-80 of 0.9 percent, while Germany
and Japan are posting annual productivity gains of 2.3
p rcent and 4.5 percent. respectively.
About the causes of these phenomena, there are as many
hypotheses as ther are experts in the audience . I would
lik to talk about the possible cause that predominates in
the minds of most corporate directors . This is the pressure
on corporal revenues that is imposed by employees'
d mands for wag s , pensions, and health insurance; by
consum rs' demands for product safety and reliability; by
accid nt victims' demands for compensation for any injury
or illness in which the product was involved ; by
communities' demands to cut down on noise , cut down on
smoke, cut down on effluents ; by investors' demands for
interest and dividends as a condition of putting money into
th company . Sometimes there is not enough revenue to go
around among all these claimants , and the company fails
right away; sometimes there is enough to go around , but not
nough to replace obsolescent facilities with newer ones,
and the company slides downhill toward eventual failure ,
or toward survival with government subsidies . It is like the
problem of over-grazing, which environmentalists worry
about . Overgrazing exists when a range would produce
more animal food if less animals were consuming it.
Overregulation exists when industries would produce more
wages, better products, and less pollution if the immediate
demands on them were diminished.
This brings us to the question whether there is an y
possibility that corporate managers ould optimize the
returns to all sectors of society if left to themselves. There
are some people who still believe that this sort of optimali t
will result from pure profit-seeking . I will not deal with this
hypothesis, because I think it has been exploded b the
economists' anal sis of "externalities." Another hypothesis
is that corporate managers would , if freed from
overregulation, voluntarily choose courses of action that
favor emplo ee welfare or consumer safety or a cleaner
environment, even at some sacrifice of profits. I ould like
to explore the question of whether this h pothesis is
realistic.
For the purpose of this discussion I am going to ask. ou to
imagine-whether ou believe it or not-that there are a lot
of directors who are broad-minded. generous people , ho
are read and willing to do a little less than the. might for
the benefit of investors in order to do a little bit more for the
benefit of other constituencies.
Modif ing a popular cliche, I will call these people
"sociall responsi e directors ," without meaning to impl _
that all others are either antisocial or irresponsi e.
What I am gain to talk about is the impediments that
these nic people would meet in the legal sphere , in the
dynamics of the market, and in accepted accounting
practices if the. tried to express their" ocial responsivit ,"
in their dir ctorial decisions.

The Legal Precepts
The first impediment is what the la shave to sa about
the duti s of management. The Model Business Corporation
Act, which is fair! t pical of corporation codes, sa s that
directors should discharge their duties "in the best interests
of the corporation." The directors' guidebook, issued by the
Committ on Corporate Laws, spells this out a little more
explicit! . The directors, the sa , should "maximize
profit." They should give thought to other inter sts, but
since the ultimate aim is to ma imize profit, the directors
must do onl those things for mployees, consumers, and
comm uni ties that maximize profit for the corporation.
The paradigmatic application of this doctrine was
rendered 60-odd years ago in the famous case of the Dodge

Brothers against the Ford Motor Compan y. Henry Ford I
announced that he intended to cut annual di vid e nds to a
mere 2,000 percent on their original investment in order to
raise wages and reduce prices so as to share the profits of
his business with employees and consumers . The Michigan
Supreme Court told him that his motives were wrong , and
ordered him to distribute $19 million in dividends . The dut y
of directors was to maximize returns to the shareholders ,
the judges said. They did not restrain Henry from raising
wages or cutting prices, but only because the judges were
not sure these actions would not benefit shareholders in the
long run.
Since Henry Ford made his bold proclamation of
corporate altruism, no other American executive has , tom
knowledge, made an open admission of diverting
substantial resources from shareholders to public interests .
There are a great many public statements about serving our
emplo ees , our customers, and our countr y, especiall y in
group statements like those of the Business Roundtable , that
cannot be tied to a particular expenditure of an y identified
corporation . However. about 1960 , a British publishing
compan y sold its principal assets-a pair of newspapersand proposed to use the proceeds to pa y to its laid-off
employees amounts far in excess of those required b_ law
?r contract. One of the shareholders brought suit to pre ent
~t ~rom ~appening. The British Court of Appeal granted the
m1unct10n , and forbade the company to divert its assets to
emplo yee welfare , even if a majorit of shareholders might
ote in favor . (Parke v . Daily ews Ltd . [1962] Ch . 927) .
This e ent led, after a lag of some years, to a new
definition of th_e dut of directors in the British Companies
Act of 1980. This was an act sponsored b the Conservative
go ernment of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher , and
adopted by the Conservative majority in Parliament. It sa s:
!h e ma tte rs to w hich lh e dire clors of a company are to ha ve regard
in th e p e rformance of their functions shall include the intere sts of
th e compani e s ' emplo . ees in general as well as the interests of it
me mb e rs[§ 46 (1) ).

At another point , the Act authorizes directors to make
pro isions for the benefit of employees when thev close a
plant. " notwithstanding that [it] is not in the best interests
of the company." (§ 74(1). (2) ).
There are, of course , no similar provisions in U.S .
corporation codes .
hat happened to Henr. Ford and to the Dail Newshen the court stepped in to direct corporate action-is
on! one _o f the perils facing a sociall. responsive director .
Another 1s personal liabilit for causing loss to the
corporation . In theor . directors are personall liable for
an. loss that the corporation suffers because of decisions
that iolate their du ties of diligence and loyalty.
F~rthermore. the are liable for the whole·loss . If Ford
directors had d~cide~ to keep its Mahwah plant open at a
lo s out of cons1derat1on for the long-time employees ho
worked there. legal theory would make the directors liable
for the losses incurred , which might be tens of millions of
dollars .
!his is a v~ry odd kind of liabilit., when . ou come to
think about 1t . It has grown up as a projection of the liabilit
of so_meone who negligent! . loses a borrowed diamond . or·
neg~1ge~tly ~reeks a b?rrowed car . It is a er illogical
pro1ect1_on. since the director has to make decisions not
about his own use of property, but about uses b thousands
of emplo ees, ~~fecting thousands of shareholders . Jud e
~ho make dec1s1ons about other people 's affairs are not
liable for the losses caused b. their deci ions, e en h e n
they are re ersed . Cong~essme~ who vote on other people 's
~oney have a _complete immunity for their mistakes . But
directors are liable . ~he don_' t have the power that judges
and Congressmen en10 to wnte their own rules.
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There is, of course, a good deal of doubt about whether
these principles of law impose an real restraints on
directors in deciding for whose benefit their decisions
should be made. So long as directors appear to be trying to
act in the corporation's interests , judges generall give them
the benefit of all doubts-e en very big doubts-under the
rubric of the "business judgment rule ." On this principle,
judges approved a corporation's charitable gift to Princeton
Universit on the ground that it would bolster the free
enterprises stern, and possibly lead to the education of
chemists who would be employed by the corporation. (A.P.
Smith Mfg. Co . v. Barlow, 13 N .J.L. 145, 198 A 2d . 681, app .
den. 346 U .S. 861.) Consequently, judges are unlikely to
evaluate adversely any policies on wages , products, or
effluents that the directors purport to be making in the
corporation 's long- or short-term interest.
But this doesn ' t solve the problem . In order to persuade
labor leaders and Congressmen to get off the backs of
business , managers have to persuade them that decisions
are being made that deliberately curtail profit in favor of
the welfare of employees , consumers, and communities. If
they publicly announce that they are acting against the
corporation's financial interest, the will run into the
antagonism that judges reserve for directors who act from
the wrong motives. For example, judges will pass almost
any plan for prospective compensation, but will quickly
invalidate a bonus for past performance, because it is a gift.
The giving motive is wrong, unless it is for a public charity.
Furthermore, directors have reason to be a little skeptical
of the evidence on nonliability that emanates from
published judicial decisions. Under modern conditions, it is
hardl y possible that a case in which a director is liable
would be allowed to come to judgment . This is because of a
peculiarit of the law of directors ' indemnification. In a
shareholder's derivative suit, if judgment is entered against
a director, he may have to pay it out of his own pocket. But if
the suit is settled before judgment, the corporation can pay
the bill . Consequently, there is a tremendous impulse to
settle these cases before they come to judgment. The
corporation is usually quite willing to settle and indemnify,
for two reasons . First , the other directors and most
shareholders sympathize with the directors who are sued.
Second , the corporation generally carries insurance that
will pay 95 percent of the amount required to settle .
Now you might think that since the liability is likely to be
settled and insured, it is not of any real concern to directors.
But the y still have grounds for concern, both personal and
social. One of the personal grounds is the loss of time and
reputation in a derivative suit, which can never be fully
indemnified . A second personal ground is the insurance
thresholds, known as deductibles and retentions, and
insurance limits ; they may render a director liable for
everything under $25 ,000 and everything over $25,000,000 .
The director 's social concerns are based on the
tremendous costs of derivative suits in relation to their
benefits . Unlike judgments for product liability, which shift
mone y from producers to consumers, these suits shift
money chiefly from corporations-who pay either through
indemnification or through insurance-to lawyers .
Consequently , directors will shun derivative suits even if
they are not intimidated b y the danger of individual
liabilit y.
These considerations will strongly deter directors from
decisions that affront legal norms , even if they think the
danger of ultimate adverse judgment is very small.
Directors ' aversion to the risk of lawsuits is going to be
accentuated, I suspect, b y a development that has been
almost uni versally applauded . This is the movement toward
predominance of independent directors on corporate
boards. According to a recent Wall Street Journal survey,
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nearly 90 percent of major corporations now have
independent majorities . One of the avowed purposes of
these independent directors is to see that corporations hew
to the legal line, a d refrain from treating the corporation's
assets as their private property . If the read the Corporate
Directors' Guidebook, and learn that their duty is to
maximize profit, the are going to vote conscientiously
against giving employees any favors that are not compelled
by union pressure, and against cleaning up any effluents
that the EPA is not about to penalize.
The Takeover Threat

Now I want to leave legal duties aside , and move into a
second impediment to the line of directorial behavior that I
have called "socially responsive ." This is the ever-present
threat of a takeover . If the company is making less money
than it could , its shares will have a lower market value than
they would under a management that is more exclusively
oriented toward profit. If outsiders become aware of this
gap between actual and potential profits, anyone who can
raise the mane for a tender offer would have every reason
to buy the company, and put an end to its brief excursion
into social responsivit . Some anal sts , or pseudo-analysts,
contend that failures to maximize profit are the principal
reason wh takeovers occur .
I do not share this view of the dynamics of takeovers , but I
do believe that a firm that is visibly earning less than its
potential is ipso facto an attractive takeover target.
Moreover, if its directors confess openly that they are not
maximizing profit, they will have a hard time persuading
their shareholders to spurn the tender offer , and to hold on
for a brighter future with the incumbent managers.
The socially responsive directors may, of course, resist
the takeover bid in various ways . They may buy "gray
knights" that compete with the bidder , or buy in the blocks
of shares that look vulnerable to a tender offer . If they
succeed in beating off the tender offer, and are then sued
for wasting corporate assets in defense, they may defend on
the ground that the corporation 's interests include those of
employees, customers , and communities. When a takeover
bidder appears, an enormous well of subliminal social
responsibility bubbles into view . In this context, judges
become unusually tolerant of "social responsivity" as in the
case of the Denver Post. In that case , the court excused
expensive anti-takeover tactics , professing to recognize a
duty of the corporation to its readership, its community, and
its staff. (Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 10th Cir.,
1972.) Actually, there was little evidence of any loss to the
readership, the community, or the staff, excepting the top
executives .
This judicial indulgence will be helpful to corporate
directors if they fight off the tender off er, and are then sued
derivatively for wasting corporate assets . But it will not
help much in fighting off the tender offer itself.
Consequently , experiments in social responsivity must be
carried out with a weather eye to takeover vulnerability.

The Profit Picture

I have now mentioned two impediments to "socially
responsive directorship, " one imposed by legal theory, and
one imposed by market dynamics. I would now like to
mention a third, which is imposed by accounting practice.
Let us imagine now a group of socially responsive
directors who are unimpressed by the warnings of the
previous paragraphs and who decide to brave the dangers .
Abandoning all hope of capital gains , they decide to earn
just the minimum of profit that a public service commission
would allow a utilit to earn, and then say to their

employees, their consumers, their injury claimants, and
their environmental complainants, "Look, we are doing all
we can for you. If we do more, we will end by doing less.
Please believe us when we tell you where our limits lie."
Will the external constituencies believe them? You know
the answer.
Profits are regularly reported in the news media in a way
that greatly exaggerates the apparent amount of
discretionary expenditure. There are two sources of
misunderstanding, one of which is very superficial, and the
other more fundamental.
The superficial problem is this. If a company makes 2
cents on the dollar in one year, and 5 cents in the next year,
the newspapers and telecasters will come out with a lead
line, "Widget profits jump 150 percent." No one in this room
would attribute any significance to this line . But there are a
lot of voters at Congressional elections and at union
elections who think that it means profits at the rate of 150
percent of invested capital. Last spring, some of you may
have seen a television clip of a well-known senator who was
seeking higher office, declaiming to a crowd with a
clenched jaw, "Why should workers go hungry, while
corporations make 100 percent profits?"
After the meager results of 1980, some firms in 1981 are
likely to have gains of 1,000 percent, and you can imagine
what the senator will say then. One of the ironies of this
kind of arithmetic is that if profits rise 1,000 percent, and
then fall back by the same amount, it is only a 91 percent
decline . So the sympathy that corporations get in bad times
never equals the envy they incur in good times.
What we need is a standardized way of conveying to the
public the percentage relationship of earnings to sales, or
earnings to invested capital. rather than of current earnings
to last year's earnings. When earnings on sales of 5 billion
rise from 100 million to 300 million, the report should not be
of a 200 percent increase , but of a 4 percent increase in
earnings as a percent of sales.
A more fundamental problem is involved in the gulf
between the meaning of "profit" as it is understood by the
man in the street and the "earnings" that accountants
report. The popular meaning of profit-which is also its
etymological and its historic meaning-is the net product of
an operation , the amount that can be taken out without
diminishing productive capacity. Earnings, on the other
hand, measure the change in the firm's asset position, as
measured by monetary inputs .
Earnings and profits would be about the same thing if the
economy were stable and stagnant-the kind that
economists and accountants are referring to when the sa
"other things being equal."
But in an inflationar econom , there is a big gap. To
replace present inventor and equipment ith identical
products will require more mone . To pa higher wages
and then wait for the related revenues will require more
money. Technological advances, which require replacing
old materials with more advanced new material , widen the
gap further . There may be handsome earnings, as the
accountants figure them, but no profits at all, as the public
understands them . Yet we can be sure that if the
accountants report "earnings" of 100 million, the press will
report "profits" of 100 million . The socially conscious
director would like to explain to the public that some part of
the 100 million-perhaps all of it-will be required just to
keep the business running on its present volume. But
nobody will hear him, so long as the bottom line says "net
earnings $100,000,000."
We have made a little progress on this front with the
FASB rules on supplementary statements to show current
cost and constant dollar adjustments. We have been patting
ourselves on the back about these details, which are very
helpful to sophisticated investors . We would have more

reason to pat ourselves on the back if investors were the
only people concerned with corporate profits .
Investors may be the only constituency that votes for
directors, but they are the least of the constituencies that
create the squeeze on corporations today. The heavies are
the unions that represent employees, the legislators who
represent consumers and communities, and the judges who
devise liability rules. The socially conscious director will
never convince these constituencies that the corporation
isn't rolling in money, so long as the bottom line that hits the
press is the earnings figure reported by the accountants.

Conclusion
These are the components of the directors' dilemma
today. So long as directors purport to maximize profits, they
are politically vulnerable to an increasing burden of
demands. If they were able to make a conspicuous
demonstration of non-maximization, they would expose
themselves to derivative suits and to takeover bids.
Moreover, the prevailing system of reporting earnings
makes corporations appear to have much larger
dispensable resources than they really have, and
encourages the exertion of external pressure upon them.
Finally, the disposition of directors to be intimidated by
these deterrents to social responsivity is probably
accentuated by the current emphasis on "independent"
directors .
These considerations suggest that reformers, in their zeal
to make directors more socially responsive by compulsion,
have overlooked the possibility of allowing directors to be
more sociall responsive by free choice. The path of
voluntarism has never been explored.
If I had just been elected president, I would now tell you
what m program is, and how it will resolve all these
difficulties and move the nation into a brighter future.
Luckily for me, and even more luckily for you, I have not
been elected to an thing. I have not even been elected to
propose solutions to this conference. But I seize this
opportunity to tell you that I believe in the capacity of
American business enterprise to respond to the challenges
of the 1980's, and to win back much of the public confidence
that it lost so catastrophically during the 1960's and 1970's.
Alfred F . Conard
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